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Foreword 
Accident analysis models and methods provide safety professionals with a 
means of understanding why accidents occur.  Choosing an analysis 
technique is, however, not a simple process.  A wide range of methods are 
available; each offering various theoretical and practical benefits and 
drawbacks.  Furthermore, individuals engaged in accident investigation are 
subjected to various factors, e.g. budgetary and time constraints, which can 
influence their selection and usage of an analysis tool.  
This report is based on an extensive review of the accident analysis literature 
and an interview study conducted with 42 safety experts and has two aims.  
Firstly, it provides an overview of the available analysis techniques and the 
factors influencing an individual’s choice and usage of these methods.  The 
intention is to provide the reader with information that may enable them to 
make a more informed selection of analysis tool.  The second aim is to 
present an analysis model currently used in industry.  The intention is to 
provide the reader with a validated method that can be readily employed, if 
undertaking a detailed assessment of the available techniques is not 
practicable.
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1. Introduction 
Understanding why accidents occur and how to prevent their recurrence is an 
essential part of improving safety in any industry.  Gaining this knowledge 
requires determining why a certain combination of events, conditions and 
actions lead to a specific outcome, i.e. accident analysis (Hollnagel et al., 
2008).  Important tools used to achieve this understanding are the accident 
causation model and accident analysis method.  Analysis models provide a 
conceptual representation of accident causation whereas analysis methods 
provide a means of applying this theory.    
The nature of accident causation has, however, become more complex over 
time due to a number of factors, e.g. the rapid pace of technological advances 
and more complex relationships between humans and technology (Leveson, 
2011).  Accident causation theory has also developed to capture this 
increased complexity and numerous analysis models and methods have 
emerged to apply this knowledge.     
Selecting a technique to use from the wide range of analysis models and 
methods presents a dilemma for any individual.  The sheer number of 
analysis tools (well in excess of 100) makes the task of assessing each one 
impracticable.  Other factors must, therefore, be considered when deciding 
which technique is adopted and used, e.g. its usability and how well 
established it is within industry. 
1.1. Purpose and scope 
The initial aim of this report is to provide an overview of the different 
categories of analysis model and method which are available.  The intention is 
not to provide a detailed review of analysis techniques, as these are currently 
available in the research and practitioner literature (e.g. Energy Institute, 
2008; Johnson, 2003).  Rather the purpose is to give the reader an 
awareness of the general concepts underlying each category and provide a 
focus for any further investigation they wish to undertake. 
The report then presents a range of factors that influence an individual’s 
approach to accident analysis and can prevent the adoption and usage of 
analysis techniques.  The aim is to provide the reader with an increased 
awareness of the issues that shape their choice of method and provide a 
framework to review their selection. 
Finally, the report provides a description of an analysis technique that is 
currently employed by a government accident investigation authority.  The 
method has been refined and validated over a period of years and enables 
the application of accident causation theory in a practical and usable manner.  
The purpose is to provide the reader with an ‘off-the-shelf’ analysis tool that 
can be readily employed, if the identification and assessment of alternative 
methods is not practicable. 
3 
 
2. Analysis models and methods 
A key driver for the continued rise in analysis model and method numbers is 
the ever-increasing complexity of socio-technical systems (which are 
comprised of interacting human, technological and environmental 
components) and the resulting change in accident causation mechanisms.  As 
researchers have sought to account for these changes, the ensuing 
development of analysis techniques can be described as having gone through 
three major phases, i.e. sequential, epidemiological and systemic.  This 
categorisation relates to the different underlying assumptions of accident 
causation (Hollnagel and Goteman, 2004).  This distinction is not obligatory 
and other classification systems based on differing accident characteristics 
exist (e.g. Kjellén, 2000) (Katsakiori et al., 2009).  However, it helps explain 
the desire of researchers to introduce systems theory concepts into accident 
analysis, as detailed in the following sections. 
2.1. Sequential techniques 
The sequential class of models and methods describe accidents as the result 
of time-ordered sequences of discrete events.  They assume that an 
undesirable event, i.e. a ‘root cause’, initiates a sequence of events which 
lead to an accident and that the cause-effect relation between consecutive 
events is linear and deterministic.  This implies that the accident is the result 
of this root cause which, if identified and removed, will prevent a recurrence of 
the accident.  Examples include the Domino model (Heinrich, 1931), Fault 
Tree Analysis (Watson, 1961 cited in Ericson, 1999) and the Five Whys 
method (Ohno, 1988). 
These methods work well for losses caused by physical component failures or 
the actions of humans in relatively simple systems and generally offer a good 
description of the events leading up to an accident (Leveson, 2004). However, 
the cause-effect relationship between the management, organisational and 
human elements in a system is poorly defined by these techniques and they 
are unable to depict how these causal factors triggered the accident 
(Rathnayaka et al., 2011).  From the end of the 1970’s it became apparent 
that the sequential tools were unable to adequately explain a number of major 
industrial accidents, e.g. Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Bhopal.  
Consideration for the role that organisational influences play in accidents was 
required and resulted in the creation of the epidemiological class of analysis 
tools.  
2.2. Epidemiological techniques 
Epidemiological models and methods view accidents as a combination of 
‘latent’ and ‘active’ failures within a system, analogous to the spreading of a 
disease (Qureshi, 2007).  Latent conditions, e.g. management practices or 
organisational culture, are likened to resident pathogens and can lie dormant 
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within a system for a long time (Reason et al., 2006).  Such organisational 
factors can create conditions at a local level, i.e. where operational tasks are 
conducted, which negatively impact on an individual’s performance (e.g. 
fatigue or high workload).  The scene is then set for ‘unsafe acts’, such as 
errors and violations, to occur.  Therefore, the adverse consequences of 
latent failures only become evident when they combine with unsafe acts, i.e. 
active failures, to breach the defences of a system.  The most well-known 
epidemiological technique is the Swiss Cheese model (Reason, 1990, 1997), 
which has formed the conceptual basis for various analysis methods, e.g. the 
Human Factors Analysis & Classification System (HFACS) (Wiegmann and 
Shappell, 2003) and Tripod Beta. 
The epidemiological class of techniques better represent the influence of 
organisational factors on accident causation, when compared with the 
sequential tools.  Given that they require an individual to look beyond the 
proximal causes of an accident and examine the impact of a system’s latent 
conditions, a more comprehensive understanding of an accident can be 
achieved.  However, many are still based on the cause-effect principles of the 
sequential models, as they describe a linear direction of accident causation 
(Hollnagel, 2004).  From the late 1990’s, a number of researchers e.g. 
(Rasmussen, 1997; Leveson, 2001; Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002) argued 
that these epidemiological techniques were no longer able to account for the 
increasingly complex nature of socio-technical system accidents.  The 
application of systems theory was subsequently proposed as a solution to this 
issue. 
2.3. Systemic techniques 
Systems theory is designed to understand the structure and behaviour of any 
type of system.  Rather than treating accidents as a sequence of cause-effect 
events, it describes losses as the unexpected behaviour of a system resulting 
from uncontrolled relationships between its constituent parts.  In other words, 
accidents are not created by a combination of latent and active failures; they 
are the result of humans and technology operating in ways that seem rational 
at a local level but unknowingly create unsafe conditions within the system 
that remain uncorrected.  From this perspective, simply removing a ‘root 
cause’ from a system will not prevent the accident from recurring.  A holistic 
approach is required whereby safety deficiencies throughout the entire system 
must be identified and addressed.  A range of systemic tools exist which 
enable the application of the systems approach, e.g. the Systems Theoretic 
Analysis Model and Processes model (STAMP) (Leveson, 2004, 2011), the 
Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2004, 2012) and 
the Accimap (Rasmussen, 1997).  
Whilst these systemic techniques appear to provide a deeper understanding 
of accident causation, various studies suggest they are more resource 
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intensive and require considerable amounts of domain and theoretical 
knowledge to apply (e.g. Ferjencik, 2011; Johansson and Lindgren, 2008).    
Furthermore, the latest version of the Swiss Cheese model (see Reason, 
1997) acknowledges that active failures are not always required for an 
accident to happen; long-standing latent conditions are sometimes all that is 
required, as was the case in the Kings Cross, Piper Alpha and the space 
shuttles Challenger and Columbia accidents (see Reason et al., 2006).  It also 
acknowledges that latent conditions can be better described as organisational 
factors, rather than management failures.  This represents top-level 
managerial decisions as ‘normal behaviour’ influenced by the local conditions, 
resource constraints and objectives of an organisation. 
The distinction between the epidemiological and systemic perspective of 
accidents, therefore, seems to be a subtle one.  However, a number of 
studies have compared systemic methods with established Swiss Cheese 
based methods, such as HFACS (Salmon et al. 2012) and the Systemic 
Occurrence Analysis Methodology (e.g. Arnold, 2009) and commented that 
the systemic techniques do provide a deeper understanding of how the 
behaviour of the entire system can contribute to an accident. 
Whilst the ‘systems approach’ is arguably the dominant concept within 
accident analysis research, systemic models and methods are yet to gain 
widespread acceptance within the practitioner community (Underwood and 
Waterson, 2013). 
2.4. Model and method category selection 
In order to choose which category of analysis technique best suits an 
individual’s needs, a useful starting point is to consider the type of system 
being analysed.  Systemic techniques are designed to provide a depth of 
understanding for complex accidents that is greater than the sequential and 
epidemiological models and methods.  However, it may be inefficient to use 
these more complex and powerful methods to investigate accidents in simple 
systems.  Therefore, understanding the complexity of the system in question 
will help to identify the most suitable method.  Hollnagel (2008) provides a 
means of characterising systems, based on the work of Perrow (1984), which 
considers their coupling and tractability (manageability).   
The coupling of a system can vary between being loose and tight and refers 
to how subsystems and/or components are functionally connected or 
dependent upon each other.  Tightly coupled systems can be described as 
follows: 
• Buffers and redundancies are purposively part of the design 
• Delays in processing are not possible 
• Process sequences are invariant 
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• The substitution of supplies, equipment, personnel is limited and 
anticipated in the design 
• There is little slack possible in supplies, equipment, and personnel 
• There is only one method to reach the goal 
• Tightly coupled systems are difficult to control because an event in one 
part of the system quickly will spread to other parts 
A system’s manageability can vary from high (tractable) and low (intractable).  
A tractable system can be characterised as: 
• The principles of the system’s functioning are known 
• System descriptions are simple and with few details 
• The system does not change while it is being described, i.e. changes in 
system activities are slow enough that the whole system can be described 
completely and in detail 
Hollnagel (2008) suggests that a good example of a tractable system is the 
normal functioning of a post office, or the operation of a home furnace. He 
also proposes that the outage at a nuclear power plant or the activities in a 
hospital emergency department represent good examples of intractable 
systems, given that their activities are not standardised and change so rapidly 
that it is never possible to produce a detailed and complete description. 
Using the dimensions of coupling and manageability, Hollnagel (2008) 
characterises a number of systems (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1 - System characteristics (adapted from Hollnagel, 2008) 
 
The locations of the systems presented in Figure 1 are illustrative and the list 
is clearly not exhaustive.  Therefore, the reader is encouraged to consider the 
characteristics of their own organisation/system and its location on Figure 1.  
Hollnagel and Speziali (2008) provide a number of questions to help 
determine these characteristics: 
Question 
System characteristic 
Tractable Intractable 
Was the accident similar to something that 
has happened before, or was it new and 
unknown? (The answer should be based 
on the history of the organisation and the 
industry it operates in) 
Similar 
accident 
New and unknown 
accident 
Was the organisation ready to respond to 
the accident, in the sense that there 
were established procedures or guidelines 
available? 
Ready to 
respond Not ready to respond 
Was the situation quickly brought under 
control or was the development lengthy? 
Quickly under 
control Lengthy development 
8 
 
   
Question 
System characteristic 
Loosely 
coupled Tightly coupled 
Was the accident and the material 
consequences confined to a clearly 
delimited subsystem (technological or 
organisational) or did it involve multiple 
subsystems, or the whole installation? 
Delimited 
subsytem 
Multiple subsystems, 
whole system 
Were the consequences on the whole 
expected / familiar or were they novel / 
unusual? 
Expected Novel 
Were the consequences in proportion to 
the initiating event, or were they 
unexpectedly large (or small)? 
Proportional 
consequences 
Consequences of 
unexpected 
Table 1 - System characteristics criteria (based on Hollnagel and Speziali, 
(2008)) 
 
However, the question of which category of analysis models and methods 
best suits a given system still remains.  Hollnagel (2008) evaluated a number 
of analysis tools and mapped them on to Figure 1, based on their suitability 
for analysing a system of a given level of coupling and tractability.  For 
example, he suggests that the STAMP and FRAM systemic methods are best 
suited for analysing accidents in tightly coupled systems with low 
manageability.  As a guiding principle, this report suggests which of the three 
model/method categories is most suitable for accident analysis in a system 
with a given level of coupling and manageability in Figure 2. 
No class of analysis technique has been assigned to the lower right-hand 
quadrant of Figure 2, as no models or methods are applicable for loosely 
coupled systems with low manageability.  Hollnagel (2008) suggests this is 
because no major accidents have occurred in systems of this nature and, 
therefore, there was no drive to develop any relevant analysis tools.  
It is important to note that the locations of the boundaries between the model 
and method categories in Figure 2 are notional and will not be this distinct in 
reality.  It is also notable that the technique employed should provide a 
suitably deep understanding of how an accident occurred.  Effective 
recommendations cannot be devised without this understanding.  If an 
individual finds that gaps in their knowledge of a given accident cannot be 
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addressed by their current analysis tool they should consider using an 
alternative, more powerful, technique. 
In addition, determining how much of a system will be analysed should also 
be considered.  If an individual system component, e.g. a single human 
operator, or a sub-system, e.g. an aircraft fuel system, is to be analysed then 
a simpler sequential method may be appropriate.  If the entire system is to be 
examined and the analysis will incorporate the organisational (and possibly 
regulatory and governmental) contribution to an accident, then 
epidemiological or systemic techniques should be considered. 
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Figure 2 - Analysis technique suitability (adapted from Hollnagel (2008)) 
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3. Influences on analysis model and method selection 
Whilst the selection of an analysis technique may be affected by the 
characteristics of the system in which it is employed, a number of other 
influential factors exist.  A range of these additional issues were identified in a 
study carried out by Underwood and Waterson (2013).  Interviews were 
conducted with 42 safety professionals based in ten countries.  The nine full 
time accident investigators, 17 health and safety professionals, ten human 
factors specialists and six researchers had experience of working in at least 
one of 25 industries.  The interviewees were asked about their current 
approach to accident and/or risk analysis, their knowledge of analysis 
techniques and their views on the communication between the researcher and 
practitioner communities.   
The factors that were considered to influence the selection of analysis 
techniques are detailed in the remainder of Section 3.   
3.1. Model and method awareness 
In order to use an analysis technique it is clear that an individual must first 
become aware of it.  However, various issues exist which may prevent this 
from occurring. 
Some individual’s simply have no desire to change their current approach 
and, therefore, have no need for new information.  In this case it is important 
that the individual has evidence that their chosen analysis method provides a 
sufficient understanding of accidents to develop safety recommendations that 
prevent recurrence.  If the same accidents keep occurring, despite efforts to 
prevent them, then the individual should consider using a more powerful 
analysis tool to gain a deeper understanding of why this is so.  If this tool 
provides further insights into the causes of the accidents then more effective 
recommendations may be devised. 
Awareness of analysis methods is also dictated, at least in part, by the level of 
training received by an individual.  The extent of training received appears to 
be role-dependent.  Full-time investigators, for example, sometimes receive 
extensive training via university-level courses, whereas practitioners with 
varying degrees of involvement with accident investigation may receive less 
training or none at all. 
Individuals who are not provided with training and undertake a search for 
information regarding analysis methods face issues which may limit their 
awareness.  Such issues include the cost of information and the time required 
to gather and read it.  In addition, some accident analysis information 
presented in the academic literature maybe considered by some individuals to 
be too conceptual and provide little or no practical benefit. 
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Providing usage guidance for the various analysis methods is beyond the 
scope of this report.  However, for those individuals who require information 
about accident analysis techniques, the reader is referred to the material 
listed in Appendix A. 
3.2. Model and method adoption 
Even if a sufficient awareness of analysis methods is obtained by an 
individual, various barriers may prevent a technique from being adopted.  For 
example, the needs of end users may not have been successfully accounted 
for during the development of an analysis method.  An individual’s decision to 
adopt a method can also be based on personal selection criteria, such as how 
well the technique’s approach suits their way of thinking or whether they have 
previously used the method. 
The analysis approach taken by an individual can be influenced by their need 
to assign liability for an accident.  Some individuals prefer (or are mandated) 
to avoid seeking blame in favour of focusing on safety improvements. This 
may lead them to using methods which focus on safety deficiencies 
throughout an entire system, e.g. a systemic method (see Section 2.3).  
However, others more concerned with the commercial and legal implications 
of accidents may select a method which simplifies the task of singling out a 
‘root cause’ to blame for an accident, e.g. a sequential technique (see Section 
2.1).  This is particularly evident when those who are conducting an 
investigation may be deemed culpable and are incentivised to apportion 
liability elsewhere. 
The track record of use within industry that a method has established plays an 
important part in whether it is adopted by individuals and organisations.  
Without a history of application in practice, there can be reluctance to trial new 
analysis methods, as their credibility maybe questioned. 
3.3. Model and method usage 
The level of effort invested in an analysis will be based, at least in part, by the 
resources available to an investigation team.  Consequently this can affect 
whether an individual/team employs more complex analysis techniques.  In 
addition to affecting which analysis method is used, the time and financial 
constraints involved in accident investigation can also affect how it is used.  
The depth of analysis that can be achieved, for example, is limited by the time 
available to the investigation team. 
The usability of an analysis method will affect whether an analysis is 
performed effectively and efficiently.  In order for a technique to have 
adequate usability it must be easy to understand and apply.  Consideration 
should, therefore, be given to the availability and clarity of guidance material 
as well as the training and resources required to use a given analysis method.   
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The graphical output of a method will affect the ability of an individual (or team 
of investigators) to successfully perform an analysis.  Graphically representing 
an accident has been considered to be useful by both researchers (e.g. Sklet, 
2004; Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002) and practitioners (e.g. Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau, 2008) for a number of reasons.  For example, it can 
be easier to see the relationships between system components and identify 
gaps/weaknesses in the analysis.  Also, charting an accident can also be 
useful for communicating the findings of complex investigations (Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau, 2008).  Therefore, it is important to consider if a 
given method provides these benefits and the resources which are required to 
graphically describe the accident.  For example, does the analysis method 
need specialised charting software or the simpler combination of sticky-notes 
and a whiteboard? 
A number of factors related to the reliability of a method (i.e. the consistency 
of results obtained when a given accident is analysed separately by different 
individuals or reanalysed by the same person) can also affect its usage.  For 
example, an individual’s background and experience can influence their 
analysis approach and produce variation in investigation findings.  Open 
discussions and analysis reviews which result in a consensus on the 
investigation findings can help minimise the biasing effects of individuals’ 
backgrounds; a process which is common with full-time investigators.  
However, the qualitative nature of some analysis tools may increase the 
difficulty of reaching such an agreement.  The reliability of a method is further 
affected by the availability and clarity of usage guidance.  Less guidance 
increases the flexibility of an analysis and gives an individual more freedom to 
probe into different aspects of an event.   Whilst this flexibility maybe suited to 
an experienced investigator, a more structured approach may improve the 
consistency of analysis outputs of less experienced individuals. 
Reliability is particularly important if accident trend analysis is to be 
performed.  The greater the reliability of a method and its outputs, the more 
the results of any trend analysis can be trusted.  The use of causal factor 
taxonomies can greatly enhance the reliability of an analysis method, if the 
taxonomy is appropriate for the industry in which the accident of interest 
occurred in.  Some methods (e.g. HFACS) have been devised with industry-
specific taxonomies.  However, taxonomies can be restrictive and may require 
an investigator to ‘force fit’ a piece of information into the classification 
system.  Therefore, it is important to understand whether a given taxonomy 
meets the needs of the investigation team.   
Furthermore, individuals may not be able to gain access to the data required 
for some of the more complex, e.g. systemic, methods.  For example, such 
information may exist outside of the organisation ‘affected‘ by the accident 
(e.g. commercially sensitive documentation from an equipment supplier) or an 
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individual maybe in the ‘wrong‘ position within an organisation to address the 
whole scope of an accident (e.g. unable to interview senior managers) (Dien 
et al., 2012). 
3.4. Organisational and industry influences on model and method usage 
Some individuals have the freedom to choose which analysis technique they 
adopt and use.  However, in many cases, organisational policy dictates which 
methods are used.  Organisational policy can also impact on the resources 
available for practitioners to learn and use new analysis methods. 
The degree of regulation within a given industry can have a large influence on 
what type of analysis techniques are used in accident investigation and risk 
assessments.  For example, regulation in the nuclear industry is prescriptive, 
with regards to the use of analysis methods.  Regulation in other industries 
however, e.g. civil aviation, provides the investigator with a greater degree of 
method selection flexibility, despite the adoption of a given analysis model by 
the regulator (such as the Swiss Cheese model used by the International Civil 
Aviation Organization). 
The effort and cost of implementing a new analysis method within an 
organisation, or throughout an industry, by means of new regulations can 
create resistance to change.  This inertia can also increase due to a number 
of other factors, e.g. the level of industry regulation or the number of 
stakeholders involved in effecting the change. 
3.5. Method and model selection summary 
Any of the factors described in Sections 3.1 – 3.4 may prevent an individual 
from becoming aware of, adopting and/or using a new analysis technique.  
However, it is likely that they all, to a greater or less extent, combine to inhibit 
the application of new models and methods. 
Some individuals may not be in a position to influence some/all of these 
factors and, therefore, will have to continue using their current analysis 
method.  However, if the investigator has an opportunity to select which 
technique they will use, considering the following questions may help them 
reach a more informed decision. 
• How complex is the system to be analysed, i.e. what is the level of 
coupling and tractability of the system? 
• How much of the system will be analysed? 
• What is the type of method that I currently use (sequential, epidemiological 
or systemic) and is it suitable for analysing the system I am interested in? 
• What alternative methods are available and are they more suitable for the 
current analysis? 
14 
 
• How easy is the method to understand and use? 
• How much usage guidance material is available? 
• What resources are required to use the method, e.g. specialist software? 
• Does the graphical output of the method help facilitate the analysis, e.g. 
identify evidence gaps?  
• Does the method provide a useful means of communicating the findings of 
an analysis with others, e.g. colleagues or non-experts? 
• How reliable is the method? 
• Does the method have a structured application process? 
• Does the method have a taxonomy of factors which contribute to an 
accident? 
• Do I need to perform accident trend analysis and, if so, does a method 
exist that uses a suitable taxonomy or do I need to devise my own 
classification scheme? 
An important point to note is that, while analysis methods enable an individual 
to apply a given view of accident causation to their evidence, no single 
technique can capture the complexity of a system.  Indeed, by definition, 
analysis models (and their associate methods) are only a representation of 
reality. 
Therefore, individuals engaged in accident analysis should not consider that 
one technique is necessarily appropriate to analyse every aspect of every 
accident.  The analyst should not force fit evidence into their analysis, or 
reject it, simply to comply with the application requirements of their chosen 
method.  While a method will guide the analyst to collect evidence and help 
interpret the data, the analysis should not be constrained by the method.  
Therefore, it maybe necessary to use more than one method so that the 
strengths of one technique will compensate for the weaknesses of another.   
For example, a sequential method maybe more suitable to analyse the 
technical failures in a system, whereas a systemic technique maybe more 
effective at analysing the wider organisational issues.  This multi-method 
approach has been has been successfully utilised by both researchers (e.g. 
Ferjencik, 2012; Harris and Li; 2011) and practitioners (e.g. Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau, 2008 p.38; Dutch Transport Safety Board, 2012) 
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4. A useful analysis model 
As described in Section 1, there are many accident analysis models and 
methods available.  Whilst this report has so far provided some guidance on 
how to select an appropriate analysis technique, it is acknowledged that 
individuals may not have time to perform a comprehensive method 
comparison.  Therefore, this section provides the reader with an ‘off-the-shelf’ 
analysis tool that can be readily employed. 
The analysis technique in question is the Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
(ATSB) accident investigation model and has been used in transport accident 
investigations by the ATSB since 2002 (ATSB, 2008).  As such, the model 
has been empirically validated by a governmental investigation agency, which 
is highly regarded within the accident investigation community (ATSB, 2008).  
Therefore, the ATSB model arguably represents a ‘tried and tested’ class-
leading analysis technique.  Furthermore, a detailed (and publically available) 
description of the model and its use is provided by the ATSB (2008).  
Therefore, the user of the model has free access to guidance material which 
can enhance the usability and reliability of the model. 
4.1. Description of the ATSB model 
The ATSB investigation analysis model (referred to hereafter as the ‘ATSB 
model’) is a modified version of the well-known Swiss Cheese model (SCM).  
As per the SCM, the ATSB model provides a general framework that can 
guide data collection and analysis activities during an investigation (ATSB, 
2008 p.36).  However, various alterations to the original SCM were made by 
the ATSB to improve its usability and the identification of potential safety 
issues.  Such changes include an enhanced ability to combine technical 
issues into the overall analysis, the use of neutral language and emphasising 
the impact of preventative, as well as reactive, risk controls.  To highlight the 
changes made, the ATSB (2008) presented a latter version of the SCM (see 
Fig. 3) and their adaptation to it (see Fig. 4). 
Unsafe 
acts
Local 
conditions
Organisational 
conditions Accident
Defences
 
Figure 3 – Latter version of the SCM (adapted from ATSB (2008)) 
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Figure 4 – ATSB adaptation of the SCM (adapted from ATSB (2008)) 
 
As indicated by Fig. 4, the ATSB model views organisations as goal seeking 
systems whose performance can become unsafe from the result of interacting 
events and conditions.  In this situation risk controls are required to prevent an 
accident from occurring or minimise the severity of its consequences (ATSB, 
2008 p.36).  These risk controls are akin to the layers of defences portrayed in 
Fig. 3. 
Whereas Fig. 4 highlights some of the changes that the ATSB made to the 
SCM, the official representation of the ATSB model which is used during 
investigations is presented in Figure 5.  The model represents the operation of 
a system via five levels of ‘safety factors’, where a safety factor is an event or 
condition that increases safety risk (ATSB, 2008).  The first three levels 
correspond to ‘safety indicators’, i.e. safety factors dealing with the individual 
or local aspects of an accident.  Safety indicators are not generally safety 
issues themselves, but may provide indications that safety issues exist 
(ATSB, 2008 p.19).  The upper two levels address ‘safety issues’, i.e. safety 
factors associated with organisational or systemic issues.  The following 
section provides a brief overview of each of the levels of the model (see ATSB 
(2008) for more details). 
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Occurrence Events
(including technical problems)
What events best describe the occurrence?
Individual Actions
What individual actions increased safety risk?
Local Conditions
What aspects of the local environment may have 
influenced the individual actions/technical problems?
Risk Controls
What could have been in place to reduce the likelihood 
of or severity of problems at the operational level?
Organisational Influences
What could have been in place to minimise problems 
with the risk controls?Safety 
issues
Safety 
indicators
In
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at
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n 
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th
 
Figure 5 – The ATSB Investigation Analysis Model (adapted from ATSB 
(2008)) 
 
4.2. ATSB model terminology 
Occurrence events are the key events (including technical problems) which 
describe an accident or incident, or which ultimately need to be explained by 
an investigation, i.e. they are the safety factors that describe 'what happened'. 
Individual actions are the observable behaviours of operational personnel.  
Operational personnel are those individuals who can have a relatively direct 
impact on system safety, e.g. flight crew and maintenance personnel. 
Local conditions are conditions which exist in the immediate environment or 
context in which individual actions or technical events take place, and which 
can influence the individual actions or technical events. Local conditions 
include characteristics of the individuals and the equipment involved, as well 
as the nature of the task and the physical environment (ATSB, 2008). 
Risk controls are the measures created by an organisation to facilitate and 
assure the safe performance of operational system components, i.e. 
operational personnel and equipment. They can be viewed as the outputs of 
the organisation’s safety management system and can be categorised as 
‘preventative’ or ‘recovery’.  Preventive risk controls are designed to minimise 
the likelihood of undesirable local conditions, individual actions and 
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occurrence events. These controls facilitate and guide performance at the 
operational level and can include procedures, training, equipment design and 
work rosters.  Recovery controls are put in place to detect and correct (or 
otherwise minimise) the adverse effects of local conditions, individual actions 
and occurrence events. These ‘last line’ controls include warning systems, 
emergency equipment and emergency procedures.  
Organisational influences are those conditions which influence the 
effectiveness of an organisation’s risk controls and can be classed as internal 
organisational conditions or external influences.  Internal organisational 
conditions are the safety management processes and other organisational 
characteristics which influence the effectiveness of its risk controls. Examples 
of safety management processes include hazard identification, risk 
assessment, change management and training needs analysis.  External 
influences are the processes and characteristics of external organisations 
which impact on an organisation’s risk controls and its internal organisational 
conditions. Various external influences exist, e.g. regulatory standards and 
surveillance or pressures and standards provided by industry associations 
and international standards organisations. 
4.3. ATSB model usage 
The ATSB suggest that the most effective way of using the model to identify 
potential safety factors is to start at the bottom level and work upwards, 
asking a series of strategic questions.  Broad questions for each level are 
included in Fig. 5.  The ATSB (2008 p.49-56) also provide detailed guidance 
on their investigation approach and how potential safety factors can be tested 
for their existence, their influence on an accident and whether they require 
further analysis. 
Many accident analysis techniques use charts to graphically represent the 
findings of an investigation and the ATSB model is no exception.  Use of 
analysis charts can make it easier to see the potential relationships between 
safety factors, identify gaps in the analysis which require further explanation. 
Furthermore, charts can also be useful for communicating the findings of 
complex investigations.  A charting format preferred by the ATSB is based on 
the Accimap method (Rasmussen, 1997).  It shows the occurrence events 
involved in an accident from left to right and adds the contributing safety 
factors to these events in a series of hierarchical layers.  The influence that a 
given safety factor has on others is indicated by a connecting arrow.  An 
example of such an analysis chart is presented in Fig. 6.  In the ATSB’s 
experience, the use of this charting format has considerably helped the 
explanation of complex accidents and incidents to industry personnel during 
presentations and courses.   
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Figure 6 - Safety factors chart of the Lockhart River Metro 23 aviation 
accident (from ATSB (2008)) 
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As with any model of accident causation, the ATSB model has limitations.  For 
example, many safety factors can be proposed which do not neatly fall into 
one of the levels.  Furthermore, the limited descriptive nature of the model 
does not fully explain the complex, dynamic nature of accident development.  
An important example is the concept of local rationality.  Actions and 
decisions taken by people at all levels of a system are affected by their local 
goals, resource constraints and external influences.  To understand why an 
individual (or team) took a decision or course of action, such activity must be 
placed in context by examining the local conditions.  The ATSB model 
explicitly addresses this requirement at the operational level, however, the 
context in which organisational influences were generated are not 
incorporated into the model.  Therefore, the user should investigate, if 
possible, the local conditions that were present at the organisational level of a 
system.  This will help achieve a deeper understanding of an accident and 
avoid the inappropriate blaming of an organisation’s management. 
As well as investigating individual accidents and incidents, there is often a 
need to analyse data from multiple events to identify trends in contributing 
factors.  The use of taxonomies to classify contributing factors is a convenient 
way to achieve this, albeit that they restrict the flexibility of an analysis (see 
Section 3.3).  The ATSB model does not have a publically available taxonomy 
so the user, if free to do so, would need to devise an appropriate classification 
system for their organisation/industry.  However, many users may already 
have a given taxonomy in place, which is incorporated into an organisational 
and/or regulatory database, and this may not be possible. 
Despite these limitations, the ATSB (2008) state that their experience of using 
the model has shown that it provides an appropriate balance between ease of 
use and full realism when identifying potential safety factors and 
communicating the findings of safety investigations.   
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Appendix A – Useful sources of accident analysis information 
The sources of information provided below give a general coverage of the 
accident analysis and its associated methods. 
Free sources of information 
• Australian Transport Safety Bureau (2008) – Analysis, Causality and Proof 
in Safety Investigations 
This document provides an overview of how the ATSB conduct investigations 
and the analysis model they have developed, as well as a useful summary of 
the Swiss Cheese model and how suitable it is for accident analysis. 
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/27767/ar2007053.pdf 
• Energy Institute (2008) – Guidance on investigating and analysing human 
and organisational factors aspects of incidents and accidents 
This document offers practitioner-focused guidance on accident investigation, 
analysis method selection and an overview of a number of different analysis 
tools. 
http://www.energyinstpubs.org.uk/tfiles/1354473348/817.pdf 
• Erik Hollnagel’s website 
This website provides details about the FRAM systemic analysis method and 
a list of publications utilising the technique. 
http://www.functionalresonance.com/ 
• Hollnagel and Speziali (2008) – Study on Developments in Accident 
Investigation Methods: A Survey of the “State-of-the-Art” 
This report provides a useful overview of some accident analysis methods 
and their suitability for analysing systems with different complexities. 
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/56/94/24/PDF/SKI-Report2008_50.pdf 
• Johnson (2003) - Failure in safety critical systems: A handbook of incident 
and accident reporting 
This book provides a detailed description of various facets of accident 
investigation, including accident analysis methods. 
http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/book/ 
• Nancy Leveson’s website 
This website provides numerous articles and presentations about the use of 
the systemic STAMP method for accident and hazard analysis. 
sunnyday.mit.edu/ 
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• Qureshi (2007) - A review of accident modelling approaches for complex 
socio-technical systems 
This article provides a comprehensive overview of the development of 
accident causation theory and techniques. It is available from the following 
website (a free account must be set up in order access the full document). 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1387046&dl=ACM&coll=DL&CFID=2154499
66&CFTOKEN=66373980 
• Reason et al. (2006) – Revisiting the Swiss Cheese model of accidents 
This report, prepared for EUROCONTROL gives a detailed account about the 
development and current status of the well known Swiss Cheese model.  
http://www.eurocontrol.int/eec/gallery/content/public/document/eec/report/200
6/017_Swiss_Cheese_Model.pdf 
Other sources of information 
• Dekker, S., 2006. The field guide to understanding human error. Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
This book by Sydney Dekker provides an accessible introduction to the ‘new 
view’ of accidents, which promotes the avoidance of hindsight and blame. 
• Leveson, N., 2011. Engineering a Safer World: Systems Thinking Applied 
to Safety. The MIT Press, London. 
Comprehensive coverage of systems theory, STAMP and its various 
applications is contained in this book.  Also, a description is provided as to 
why systemic accident analysis is required. 
• Hollnagel, E., 2012. FRAM—The Functional Resonance Analysis Method. 
Ashgate, Farnham. 
The FRAM method is described and demonstrated in this book, along with 
information about its underlying theory and the need for systemic accident 
analysis. 
• Salmon et al., 2011. Human factors methods and accident analysis: 
practical guidance and case study applications.  Farnham: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited. 
This book provides a number of examples of accident analysis methods and 
how they are applied. 
 
 
 
 
